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Abstract: In cross-border transport, in particular in air-transport, since 2010 there is the notion of a known consignor. This term is used in connection with an airfreight 
distribution company, which has introduced appropriate safety and security measures into its business process. Hence, its transport units are considered “safe” and can be 
handled with fewer overheads and more quickly. Due to the ever-increasing airfreight traffic, the notion of efficient security in airfreight is becoming increasingly pressing 
and requires information technical support to be able to handle shipments in time. In order to sustain security throughout entire supply chains all consignors should adhere 
to the same security standards – build a secure supply chain. This article presents methods and mechanisms for automated authentication and authorisation of known 
consignors and their transport units that enables swift identification and secure handover of shipments among known consignors and distribution centres. In their 
application they are not bound to air-transport and can be used to secure supply chains in general. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Attempted bomb attacks by express package delivery 
service in 2010 triggered an extensive debate on security 
measures in mail and goods delivery, especially in air-
traffic. Weaknesses in transport security were investigated 
with the goal to effectively protect a supply chain. It was 
discovered that they could be lead to cargo handling 
procedures and cargo data access, as well as training of 
personnel [1]. Consequently, by the Commission 
Regulation (EU) No. 185/2010 [2] a set of measures and 
mechanisms have been defined, which have led to the 
improvement of air transport security.  
Due to increasing risk, transport units must be 
subjected to appropriate security checks, especially before 
loading them to planes or ships. This process introduces 
additional overhead, resulting in increasing transport costs 
and slowing down logistics processes. Due to cross 
docking, handovers of cargo within supply chains may 
occur multiple times. In supply chain management there 
is a notion of a cold chain, representing a temperature-
controlled supply chain, i.e. an uninterrupted series of 
storage and distribution activities, which maintain a given 
temperature range. Here, a notion of a secure supply chain 
is introduced, representing a series of storage and 
distribution activities, which maintain a given security 
standard.  
Directive (EU) No. 185/2010 with its amendments 
describes the terms that any trusted consignor or 
distribution centre needs to fulfil in air-transport in order 
to be recognised as such. It also describes the methods 
and measures it needs to apply in order to protect its own 
and transit transport units. Upon arrival of a transport 
unit, the distributor (air-carrier) needs to check the 
consignor's status and handle the transport unit 
accordingly. Inquiries about consignor status are made to 
the EU database, holding data on the current status of all 
known consignors’ locations. In case the transport unit 
does not originate from a trusted consignor, the transport 
unit is treated as unknown in concordance with all 
prescribed security measures. In case the transport unit 
originates from a trusted consignor, however, most 
security checks can be omitted and such transport units 
may progress faster. While the inquiries to the EU 
database of known (trusted) consignors are performed 
through secure information channels, the data about and 
on shipments remain unprotected, as printed one- (bar) or 
two-dimensional (QR) identification codes can easily be 
counterfeited and/or switched. 
In this article an original approach is presented to 
securing the transport units and their data as well as the 
data on their consignors in conformance with the 
Directive (EU) 195/2010 by secure automated 
authentication and authorisation methods and 
mechanisms. 
1.1 Directive (EU) No. 185/2010 
According to the regulation, the EU distinguishes 
between three types of entities in a secure supply chain: 
Regulated agent: An agent, freight forwarder or any 
other entity that handles cargo and ensures security 
controls in respect of cargo and mail. 
Known consignor: A consignor who originates cargo 
or mail for its own account and whose procedures meet 
common security rules and standards sufficient to allow 
carriage of cargo or mail on any aircraft. 
Account consignor: A consignor who originates 
cargo or mail for its own account and whose procedures 
meet common security rules and standards sufficient to 
allow carriage of that cargo or mail on all-cargo or all-
mail aircraft only. 
According to the Information for cargo handling 
entities in non-EU countries [3] air carriers that fly cargo 
or mail from a non-EU airport to an EU airport (ACC3s) 
must ensure that all cargo and mail carried to the EU is 
physically screened or comes from a secure supply chain, 
which is validated according to the EU regulations. 
Any entity that is not one of the above described 
entities is an unknown entity and may not be part of a 
secure supply chain. All cargo or mail coming from an 
unknown entity needs to be screened by or on behalf of an 
ACC3 or by a third country regulated agent before being 
loaded on board an aircraft bound for the EU. 
The basic security requirements for cargo and mail 
from non-EU countries may be found in the Annex to 
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Regulation (EU) No. 1082/2012 [4], Regulation (EU) No. 
654/2013 [5]. In their Attachments 6-C2, 6-C3 and 6-C4 
they contain the checklists, which EU aviation security 
validators use to assess an entities' compliance with the 
EU security objectives. Depending on the entities’ 
business and its current security measures, the entity may 
need to update its security programme, enhance its 
security measures or provide for the necessary screening 
equipment. The entities' security measures need to be in 
accordance with at least ICAO (International Civil 
Aviation Organization) standards. In the event an entity 
carries out screening, its screening methods need to be in 
accordance with EU requirements. 
EU aviation security validations may only be carried 
out by approved EU aviation security validators. All 
approved validators an entity may engage are included in 
an EU database [6]. 
If an entity is not validated and approved according to 
the EU requirements, it may not form part of the secure 
supply chain of an ACC3. As a consequence, all the cargo 
or mail the entity forwards will need to be screened by or 
on behalf of the ACC3 or a third country regulated agent 
before being loaded on board an aircraft bound for the 
EU. 
 
1.2 Obtaining and Sustaining Known Consignor Status 
 
According to the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 
185/2010, which speaks of defining detailed measures for 
the implementation of common standards in air-transport 
security, a known consignor can be confirmed by the 
appropriate authority. The approval itself is bound to a 
location.  
The competent authority of each member state 
determines the responsibilities for the endorsement 
process of a known consignor. An applicant shall seek for 
the approval from the competent authority of a member 
state, from which it receives guidelines for known 
consignors, according to its location. The authority carries 
out the verification of the listed consignor’s location in 
order to assess the fulfilment of the requirements by the 
applicant. By doing so, it also considers the fact, whether 
the applicant is already the holder of an Authorised 
Economic Operator (AEO) certificate (according to 
Regulation (EC) 648/2005 [7]). It uses the official 
validation list for known consignors (Annex to Regulation 
(EU) No. 1082/2012 [4], Regulation (EU) No. 654/2013 
[5]). This control list contains a declaration of obligations 
and is signed by the legal representative of the applicant 
or the person that is responsible for security at a given 
location. Once the validation control list is filled out, the 
data it contains is treated as classified information that is 
kept by the competent authority. If the authority is 
satisfied with the validation, it makes sure that on the 
following business day the necessary information about 
the consignor is entered in the database of the European 
Union (e.g. Tab. 1). Herewith, the competent authority 
attributes each approved known consignor location a 
single alphanumeric code UAI (Uniform Alphanumeric 
Identifier) in the standard format.  
A known consignor at any location assigns at least 
one person, responsible for the implementation and 
control of the security measures, at the location. This 
person must successfully pass a background check in 
advance.  
The known consignor is reaffirmed at regular time 
intervals that are not more than five years apart. This 
includes on-site verification to assess if a known 
consignor still complies with the requirements. If the 
competent authority is no longer satisfied with the 
fulfilment of requirements by the known consignor, it 
cancels its status for the specific location and makes sure 
that the change is visible in the EU database. Any known 
consignor shall be recognised as such in all Member 
States (according to Commission Regulation (EU) No. 
185/2010, pp. 30, 31 [2]).  
In order to become a known consignor, a candidate 
should at the first stage introduce certain security 
measures against unauthorised accesses to or tampering of 
transport units. They address details about the production 
process, product packaging, storage and dispatch. In its 
application, the company must also provide the details 
about the organization (name, company’s address, number 
of employees, contact information, the nature of its 
business, etc.), details of its recruitment procedures 
(permanent, temporary, etc.) and security training of all 
employees that have access to its shipments. The 
candidate needs to demonstrate the security of the cargo 
location (physical fence, barriers, alarms, doors, 
windows...). It is also essential that appropriate access 
control procedures be in place. The known consignor 
candidate needs to demonstrate that the access to the 
storage and dispatch facilities is controlled and secured. 
The known consignor candidate needs to provide details 
of the packaging process to demonstrate that all finished 
goods are checked prior to packaging and to describe the 
outer packaging, if the latter is required.  
A known consignor (candidate) needs to provide all 
details concerning the method of transportation to the 
regulated agent, evidence of qualifications of contractors 
and cargo insurance. In case the company uses its own 
transport, its drivers have to go through appropriate 
training. If the company uses external contractors, they 
are only allowed to contain the cargo in consignments. 
The consignments must be protected by seals or some 
other appropriate method. Assembled explosive and 
incendiary devices may be carried in consigned transport 
units, if the requirements of all safety rules are fully met. 
Explosive and incendiary devices, whether assembled or 
not, shall not be carried in consignments of mail. 
(Commission Regulation (EU) No 185/2010, p. 31 [2]) A 
known consignor may pass consignments, which it has 
not packaged itself, to a regulated agent, provided that 
they are separated from its native consignments and that 
their origin is clearly indicated on the consignments or the 
accompanying documentation (Aviation authority, [8]).  
The business entities from third countries who wish 
to attain known consignor status can achieve this in two 
stages. The first is by the introduction of a security 
programme that provides the certification authority with 
details on security controls of cargo or mail they deliver 
to the EU. The second stage is reaffirmation of the 
certification by validation that appropriate cargo-handling 
activities are in place at intervals not exceeding five years. 
In addition, they need to submit a copy of the report on 
their validation (Commission Regulation (EU) No. 
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185/2010, p. 37, 38 [2]). All carriers that are non-
members of the EU and deliver cargo or mail to EU 
Member States have to comply with the mentioned 
security requirements. In accordance with the Regulation 
(EU) No. 185/2010, carriers must ensure that the cargo or 
mail destined to the EU were checked or that they come 
from a secure supply chain. In order to do this, a carrier 
must be confirmed as carrier from a third country, 
delivering cargo or mail to the Member States of the EU 
(ACC3-operations in the European Union from third 
countries) [9]. 
 
1.3 Current State in Slovenia 
 
An insight into the database of regulated agents and 
known consignors in Slovenia currently reveals only three 
regulated agents (RA), all located at the international 
airport of Ljubljana, and two known consignors (KC) (see 
Tab. 1).  
While collecting information on the known 
consignors and regulated agents in Slovenia, the listed 
pharmaceutical companies Krka, d.d. and Lek, d.d., were 
consulted. In their experience the main advantage of this 
type of transport management in air transport is faster 
handling of goods on the dispatch airport, because, when 
the goods are sent by a known consignor, there is no need 
for additional security controls, e.g. X-rays of goods. So 
far their status did not bring them any direct financial 
benefit. On the other hand, the fulfilment of the 
requirements according to Directive (EU) No. 185/2010 
required substantial organisational changes, e.g. in some 
parts of the internal logistics chain it was necessary to add 
new security mechanisms in the form of complete 
technical control over the goods, ready for dispatch, 
separate flow of goods under the status of a known 
consignor and provision for flight control access to 
shipping zones. Furthermore, it was necessary to check 
impunity and provide for appropriate training of 
personnel, who are in contact with the dispatched goods, 
and need to obtain special security certificates. Hence, we 
may conclude that, in their experience, additional security 
did bring them benefits, but with a cost of the internal 
organisational changes. 
 
Table 1 List of known consignors [10] 
DHL Ekspress 
(Slovenija), d.o.o 
Zgornji Brnik 130U,  
SI-4210 Brnik 10.05.2018 (RA) 
Aerodrom 
Ljubljana, d.d. 
Zgornji Brnik 130a, 
SI-4210 Brnik 21.10.2018 
UPS Adria (S) 
Ekspres, kurirske 
storitve, d.o.o. 
Zgornji Brnik 130, 
SI-4210 Brnik 31.03.2019 (RA) 
KRKA, d.d., 
Novo mesto 
Šmarješka cesta 6, 




SI-1526 Ljubljana 03.04.2018 (KC) 
 
1.4 Related work 
 
Since air-traffic security is a broad and complex 
topic, in [11] there is an overview on all aspects of 
aviation security, from security related policies and 
regulations over passenger and baggage as well as cargo 
security. Finally, the methods and mechanisms for 
aviation security are summed up as security operations. 
To be effective a combination of policies and regulations 
resulting in appropriate methods and mechanisms with 
associated technical solutions are necessary. 
A partial solution to the implementation of air-cargo 
tracking solution with security elements has been 
presented in the case study [12]. It employed RFID 
technology to ensure tracking and secure handling of 
ULDs in air traffic. However, the associated information 
flow among consignors and distribution centres has been 
left out, hence rendering a technically sound, but, from 
supply chain security point of view, incomplete solution.  
Other partial solutions also used RFID technology to 
provide for tracking of aerospace spare parts [13, 14] to 
secure airlines. They mainly emphasize the importance of 
traceability of airline spare parts and the positioning of 
RFID readers within an aircraft to effectively monitor the 
state of installed spare parts.  
Some related works [15, 16, 17] on supply chain 
security are mainly focused on providing standards and 
regulations to ensure a maintained level of quality of 
service along supply chains, including security, based on 
lessons learned in total quality management.  
This article focuses on methods and mechanisms to 
support security while sustaining efficiency throughout 
supply chains. They are not limited to airline cargo 
transport, although they rely on standards on transport 
security that have been primarily introduced in air-
transport, in particular Commission Regulation (EU) No. 
185/2010 and associated regulations. In order to provide a 
complete solution to air-cargo security, the World Cargo 
Symposium (WCS) has been identified by the IATA 
Cargo Strategy [18] as a unifying decision making forum 
where all supporting regulations and solutions would 
come together to provide for coherent and consistent 
security solutions. 
 
1.5 IATA Cargo Strategy 2015-2020 
 
According to IATA Cargo Strategy, the ten industry 
key priorities by 2020 are: 
1) Enhancing safety 
2) Improving security 
3) Pushing for smarter regulations 
4) Strengthening the value proposition of air cargo 
5) Driving efficiency through global standards 
6) Modernizing air cargo 
7) Improving quality 
8) Protecting cash 
9) Strengthening partnerships 
10) Building sustainability 
 
Although they pertain to air transport that typically 
represents less than 1 % of world trade by volume, but on 
the other hand a 35 % of world trade by value, with 
higher value shipments and their increased security they 
should pertain to most of the world trade to build 
sustainability. Due to accelerated urbanisation, increasing 
the number of mega-cities, their mega-regions are 
expected to create agglomeration of GDP and population 
and are expected to drive the world trade. 
According to [18] safety remains the first priority. 
Some commodities may endanger the safety of the carrier, 
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its passengers and/or crew, if not shipped in accordance 
with stipulated regulations. In this respect growing 
attention is directed also towards design and use of fire 
resistant unit load devices (ULDs) used also to maintain 
the cargo in a specified temperature range. Equally 
critical the security measures need to be both efficient and 
effective. To be efficient the regulations need to be 
managed by the industry, or else they will substantially 
slow down transit times. In order to prove effective, they 
need to provide shippers with greater transparency, 
reliability and predictability. To drive efficiency, global 
standards are needed (e.g. to ensure 48 hours end-to-end 
shipping time, where the customer so demands). The 
vision is to have a paperless industry and be able to rely 
on high-quality data available on demand by all relevant 
stakeholders. To improve quality, the transportation 
industry needs to maintain reliability and consistency of 
its services. Governed by the Cargo Agency Conference 
(CAC) the Cargo Account Settlement System (CASS) 
enables the swift, reliable, and cost-efficient movement of 
founds among airlines and their cargo partners, and could 
serve as a model to developing equal systems to 
accommodate a worldwide distribution network of 
accredited cargo agents. This would also strengthen 
partnerships among carriers. 
In order to increase safety and security the focus of 
measures and mechanisms introduced is directed towards 
partnerships, information sharing and global standards. 
Besides dangerous goods, also live animals, perishables 
and pharmaceuticals require regulations and standards for 
documentation, handling and training. In order for 
security measures to be effective, information support 
mechanisms are being introduced (e.g. e-CSD, Cargo-
XML, ACI) to improve air cargo security in compliance 
with the EU ACC3 regulation without disrupting the flow 
of cargo. 
With this in mind in this article an original approach 
to securing supply chains is presented by providing them 
with appropriate information support to enable automated 
authentication and authorisation of consignors and their 
shipments and an undisrupted flow of information along 
secure supply chains. At the same time, it introduces 
mechanisms to protect transport units and their data also 
while in transit. 
 
2 AUTOMATED AUTHENTICATION AND 
AUTHORISATION IN SECURE SUPPLY CHAINS 
 
The core problem of known consignors’ transport 
units’ authentication and authorisation is the ability to 
recognise and pass them on with minimum overhead. At 
the same time, maintaining or increasing transport 
security is required. With the goal of speeding up logistics 
processes and reducing costs, the procedure of automated 
authentication and authorisation of transport units and 
their consignors is introduced, as described in the sequel. 
In the previous section the regulatory requirements 
that a secure supply chain entity needs to comply with 
according to Commission Regulation (EU) No. 185/2010 
have been described. In addition to implementing an 
appropriate security policy it needs to obtain and maintain 
its status as described. While maintaining its status it is 
enlisted in the EU database of known consignors and 
regulated agents to be recognised as such and its 
shipments to be treated accordingly. 
In response to the core problem of reducing overhead 
while identifying the transport units and determining the 
status of their consignors, the proposed automated 
authentication and authorisation procedure for known 
consignors’ transport units is being described in the 
sequel. 
 
2.1 Authentication and Authorisation Procedure 
 
The procedure to authenticate and authorise transport 
units of known consignors is designed in a way that 
guarantees transport unit's safety and confidentiality of 
data transmitted between a regulated agent (distribution 
centre) and the unit, the distribution centre and the 
authorisation authority of known consignors as well as 
between the distribution centre (regulated agent) and 
known consignors in the sense of Directive (EU) No. 
185/2010, dated 4 March 2010.  
It is defined as a protocol (see Fig. 1) and is 
composed of the following steps: 
1) While preparing a transport unit for shipment, a 
known consignor seals the unit and places a tag on its 
opening (see Fig. 2) in a way which prevents it from 
being opened without removing the tag. In the RFID 
tag's chip (see Fig. 3) the transport unit's 
identification (ID), declaration and authorisation bit 
string (ABN) are stored. 
2) Before a known consignor deploys a transport unit, it 
announces this to a distribution centre by transmitting 
the transport unit's identification (ID) and declaration 
to the centre. 
3) Upon arrival of the transport unit at a distribution 
centre, it is authenticated: it is weighed, its 
identification and declaration are read out from the 
unit's tag; the transport unit is sorted out as unknown 
in case it was not announced or its declaration data 
are inconsistent with its previously collected data. 
4) In case the authentication of the transport unit and its 
consignor were successful, the distribution centre 
generates two integers, random numbers p < q from 
the interval (0: length), where "length" matches the 
number of bits, constituting the ABN, and sends an 
authorisation request to all its known and accredited 
consignors, encrypted with the one-time key for its 
communication with the known consignor who 
announced the transport unit. Hereby, this consignor 
is solely enabled to decipher this message correctly. 
5) As response this known consignor sends the transport 
unit's ID and the part of the ABN_TOBE 
authorisation bit string from the pth to the qth bit, 
which is compared to the same part of the 
ABN_ASIS authorisation bit string read out of the 
transport unit's tag. In case the two sequences match, 
the transport unit is authorised as known. Otherwise, 
it is assumed that the transport unit was manipulated 
and, hence, it is sorted out as unknown. 
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Figure 1 Authentication & authorisation procedure of known consignors’ transport units 
 
2.2 Cargo Protection Mechanisms 
 
Automated authentication and authorisation of known 
consignors' transport units relies on relatively long bit 
strings that uniquely identify the transport units (ABN) 
and can be used for the authorisation of known consignors 
and their transport units. They are stored on sealed RFID 
tags (see Figs. 2 and 3), readable from the outside of 
transport units.  
 
 
Figure 2 Sealed transport unit with an RFID tracking device 
 
A sealed RFID chip (Fig. 3c) is connected with three 
sensors (Fig. 3c, 3b and 3d), triggering an alarm in the 
unit's tag upon electronic tampering, forced removal of 
the tag or forced opening of the transport unit. An alarm 
in the unit's tag results in the re-initialisation of its 
authorisation bit string (ABN), hereby disabling the unit's 
authorisation and rendering it unknown.  
 
 
Figure 3 Sealed RFID chip of the transport unit’s tracking device with sensors 
 
In addition, any non-protocolled reading and re-
writing of the data in the tag's RFID chip would also 
trigger the alarm. 
To protect data transfer among a regulated agent 
(distribution centre) and a known consignor, one-time key 
encryption is used, based on keys of message length. A 
synchronous data transfer protocol (see Figure 1) among 
pairs of communicating parties ensures that every key is 














ID, Declaration, ABN 
ID, Declaration 
ID, Declaration  
ID, p, q 
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2.3 Data Protection Mechanisms 
 
The procedure for the authentication and 
authorisation of known consignor’s transport units utilises 
one-time keys to encrypt the transferred messages, since 
this is the only way to ensure their complete safety and 
confidentiality. This is only possible if during encryption 
all possible encoded messages are equally possible, which 
makes any conclusions on the original message, made 
based on an intercepted encoded message, impossible.  
Corresponding with the Shannon’s theorem on coding 
data sources [19], an encryption system is completely 
secure, if and only if the number of possible keys is at 
least as great as the number of possible messages. This is 
achieved by equal lengths of messages and keys. 
Encryption algorithms usually utilise the same key over a 
longer period of time. Only encryption algorithms, for 
which holds that the available computing power is not 
sufficient to test all possible encryption keys for 
decrypting an intercepted encrypted message, are 
considered secure. Consequently, in the long run only 
encryption algorithms, which use one-time keys, are 
completely secure, considering the Shannon’s theorem. 
Hence, our procedure is based on one-time keys. In the 
sequel several examples of their generation are presented. 
The first example of one-time keys generation is 
based on sources of non-deterministic noise for every 
key-bit, e.g. sampling thermic noise of resistors, Zener-
diods or transistors and discretisation of the input signal. 
The sampled values can be stored on ordinary storage 
media in exactly two samples, one of which goes to the 
distribution centre and the other to a certain known 
consignor.  
To determine the sequence of using individual keys 
there are multiple options. It can be determined by the 
communication protocol or by the order in which they are 
stored. On the other hand, they can be chosen based on 
the iTAN-procedure of internet banking, by which for 
example a distribution centre generates a random number 
and sends it – unencrypted – to a known consignor, which 
chooses the current one-time key based on this index. 
The second example of generating one-time keys is 
based on recursive algorithms for generating pseudo-
random numbers, where the same algorithms run 
concurrently at a distribution centre and a known 
consignor location. They are based on two strictly 
separate bit-vectors – stable and unstable – and an 
endogenous signal for switching among the two. By 
applying appropriate rules for this switching, even very 
basic time-hybrid systems expose chaotic behaviour. 
Pseudo-random numbers generators need starting values, 
which can be acquired, as already elaborated by the first 
example. 
Frequent re-initialisation of recursive algorithms with 
new starting values at irregular time intervals greatly 
increases the statistical quality of the generated keys. This 
can be achieved by means of a distribution centre, 
choosing the time of re-initialisation and index to choose 
the next starting value from, by the list of keys, which a 
distribution centre and a known consignor interchanged at 
certain point in time on a secure connection and is known 
only to them. 
According to the described solution, every RFID tag 
is sealed and equipped with a permanent storage. The 
reason for not accessing it by bytes, but rather considering 
its whole content as one unique ABN is to increase the 
number of possible bit-strings for authorisation. 
Considering a known ABN-length, 2length is the number of 
all possible ABN combinations. Since its parts, which can 
start at any random position within this bit-string (random 
number p), can be used for authorisation, and they are 
randomly long (random number q), this means that we 
may have (length×length) possible ABN-parts and a total 
of (length2×2length) possible combinations. The probability 
of guessing the position, length and value of a specific 
ABN is hence (length−2×2-length), which means that with a 
realistic ABN-length of 14 bits, this probability would be 
approximately 3×10−7. 
 
3 ADVANTAGES OF SECURE SUPPLY CHAIN 
AUTOMATION 
 
To summarize, the key advantages of automatic 
authentication and authorisation of known consignors' 
transport units are: 
1) The transport units can undeniably and justifiably be 
associated with known consignors. 
2) The transport units' security throughout supply chains 
is ensured. 
3) Falsifications of transport units are recognised 
automatically. 
4) Due to automated procedures for authentication and 
authorisation of transport units less or even no 
personnel, who might manipulate the units, may be 
permitted in their surroundings. 
5) Confidentiality and safety of the data flow associated 
with transport units is guaranteed. 
6) In conformance with the procedure for automated 
authentication and authorisation of known consignors' 
transport units all telecommunications concerning the 
transport units and their transport processes fulfil the 
general goals of security: 
a) confidentiality, i.e. security of access, 
b) data integrity, i.e. protection from unauthorised 
data manipulation, 
c) authenticity, i.e. protection from forgery, as well 
as 
d) responsibility, i.e. indisputability. 
 
The combined use of such transport units’ tags and 
the described procedure for automated authentication and 
authorisation of known consignors and their shipments 
can guarantee the safety of transport units and the security 
of their associated data flows in conformance with the 
Directive (EU) No. 185/2010, dated 4. March 2010. In 
addition, the overhead associated with the handling of 




The described approach to automated authentication 
and authorisation of consignors and their consignments 
within secure supply chains reduces the number of 
persons, involved in goods manipulation and hence also 
the cost of their training and certification as well as the 
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risk of tampering. At the same time, it provides for 
automatic authentication and authorisation of transport 
units and their consignors and secures the information 
flow accompanying the shipments, which has already 
proven beneficial in maritime transport. Along with these 
benefits it introduces only a minor overhead concerning 
the implementation of the tags and information 
interchange protocols.  
The suggested authentication and authorisation 
procedure for known consignors and their transport units 
shall, hence, minimise the associated overhead and ensure 
the confidentiality of the information flow among known 
consignors and regulated agents with high reliability. In 
the long run its implementation should result in a spread 
of secure supply chains including also cross-docking 
options with other types of transport (e.g.: ship, train, 
road). Considering its information technical support this 
solution is also suitable for securing the arising intelligent 
transport units travelling on the physical internet. 
Last but not least, according to IATA Cargo Strategy, 
it combines regulations with actions to proactively 
support the functional areas of the future IATA Cargo 
Delivery Model [18]: Safety, Special Cargo, Border 
Management, e-Cargo & Quality, Operations and Industry 
Management. 
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